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Abstract
In this paper cost sharing problems are considered. We focus on
problems given by rooted trees, we call these problems cost-tree prob-
lems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called
irrigation games. A formal notion of irrigation games is introduced,
and the characterization of the class of these games is provided. The
well-known class of airport games (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977)
is a subclass of irrigation games. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953)
is probably the most popular solution concept for transferable util-
ity cooperative games. Dubey (1982) and Moulin and Shenker (1992)
show respectively, that Shapley’s (Shapley, 1953) and Young (1985)’s
axiomatizations of the Shapley value are valid on the class of airport
games.
In this paper we show that Dubey (1982)’s and Moulin and Shenker
(1992)’s results can be proved by applying Shapley (1953)’s and Young
(1985)’s proofs, that is those results are direct consequences of Shapley
(1953)’s and Young (1985)’s results. Furthermore, we extend Dubey
(1982)’s and Moulin and Shenker (1992)’s results to the class of irri-
gation games, that is we provide two characterizations of the Shapley
value for cost sharing problems given by rooted trees. We also note
that for irrigation games the Shapley value is always stable, that is it
is always in the core (Gillies, 1959).
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider cost sharing problems given by rooted trees, called
cost-tree problems. We assign transferable utility (TU) cooperative games
(henceforth games) to these cost sharing problems. The induced games are
called irrigation games. See the following example for the naming: There is
given an irrigation ditch joined to the stream by a head gate and a group
of users who use this ditch to irrigate their own farms. The functional and
maintenance costs of the ditch are given too, and they have to be payed for
by the users. One of the main questions is how to share the costs among the
users. The ditch and the related users can be represented by a rooted tree.
The root of the tree is the head gate, each node represents one user, and
the edges of the rooted tree represent the sections of the ditch. The users
are related to the ditch by these sections. In this setting Littlechild and
Owen (1973) show that the contribution vector (solution) recommended by
the sequential equal contribution, called sequential equal contributions rule,
where the costs of the sections is shared equally among the farmers who use
them and the farmers pay the total cost of the sections they use, coincides
with the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953).
For an empirical and axiomatic analysis of the sequential equal contribu-
tion see Aadland and Kolpin (1998) (they call it serial cost-share rule) who
examine a real cost-sharing problem where the irrigation ditch is located in
a south-central Montana community. The irrigation game by Aadland and
Kolpin (1998) is defined as follows: for each nonempty set of players S the
value v(S) = −c(S), where c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ RN cost-vector gives the cost
of the ditch, ci gives the cost of section i and c(S) means the minimum cost
of servicing all users in S. It is easy to verify that this game is convex. A
similar definition is presented in Kayi (2007), using ci for the whole cost
joining user i to the headgate.
When we consider special rooted trees: chains, we get the class of airport
problems, so the class of airport games (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977) is
the proper subset of the class of irrigation games. Thomson (2007) gives an
overview on the results for airport games. Up to now, two axiomatizations
of the Shapley value are considered on airport games in the literature: Shap-
ley (1953)’s and Young (1985)’s axiomatizations. Dubey (1982) shows that
Shapley (1953)’s characterization is valid on the class of airport games, and
Moulin and Shenker (1992) prove that Young (1985)’s axiomatization works
on this subclass of games.
In this paper, we introduce the formal concept of irrigation games, and
characterize the class of them. We show that the class of irrigation games is a
non-convex cone which is a proper subset of the finite convex cone spanned by
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the duals of the unanimity games, therefore every irrigation game is concave.
Furthermore, as a corollary we show that the class of airport games has the
very same characteristics as that of the class of irrigation games.
In addition to the previously listed results of this paper, we extend Dubey
(1982)’s and Moulin and Shenker (1992)’s results to the class of irrigation
games. Furthermore, we translate the axioms used in the cost sharing litera-
ture (see e.g. Thomson (2007)) to the language of transferable utility coop-
erative games, and provide results that clearly show that Dubey (1982)’s and
Moulin and Shenker (1992)’s results can be deduced directly from Shapley
(1953)’s and Young (1985)’s results. That is, we present two new variants of
Shapley (1953)’s and Young (1985)’ results, and we provide Dubey (1982)’s
and Moulin and Shenker (1992)’s and our characterizations as direct corol-
laries of the two new variants.
We also notice that the Shapley value (sequential equal contributions
rule) is stable for irrigation games, that is it is always in the core (Gillies,
1959). This result is a simple consequence of the Ichiishi-Shapley theorem
(Shapley, 1971; Ichiishi, 1981) and that every irrigation game is concave.
Up to our knowledge this is the first paper in the literature which pro-
vides a precise characterization of the class of irrigation games, and extends
Shapley (1953)’s original and Young (1985)’s axiomatizations of the Shapley
value for this class of games. We conclude that applying the Shapley value to
cost-tree problems is theoretically well-founded, therefore, since the Shapley
value behaves well from the viewpoint of computational complexity theory
(Megiddo, 1978), the Shapley value is a desirable tool for solving cost-tree
problems.
Further related literature are as follows: Granot et al. (1996) introduce
the notion of standard fixed tree game. Irrigations games and standard
fixed tree games are the same, the difference between Granot et al. (1996)’s
approach and ours is that Granot et al. (1996) assume a fixed tree, while we
allow the trees to vary. Koster et al. (2001) also consider standard fixed tree
games, and study the core of these games. Ni and Wang (2007) characterize
the rules meeting properties additivity and independence of irrelevant costs,
on the class of standard fixed tree games.
Ambec and Ehlers (2006) examine how to share a river efficiently among
countries joined to the given river. They note that cooperation exerts positive
externalities on the benefit of a coalition and explore how to distribute this
benefit among the countries of the coalition. By Ambec and Sprumont (2002)
the location of an agent (i.e. country) along the river determines the quantity
of water it controls, and thereby the welfare it can secure to itself. They call
the appropriated cooperative game consecutive game. The authors prove that
the game is convex so the Shapley value is in the core (see Shapley (1971)
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and Ichiishi (1981)).
For an other problem, for the allocation of costs and benefits from regional
cooperation, see the regional games defined by Dinar and Yaron (1986). Dif-
ferent allocations of cooperative game theory are applied, like the core, the
nucleolus, the Shapely value and the generalized Shapley value; and are com-
pared with an allocation based on marginal cost pricing. Dinar et al. (1992)
analyze a similar problem in the TU and the NTU settings (in the NTU case
the core of the related game is non-convex, so the Nash-Harsa´nyi solution is
applied).
In this paper, we consider only Shapley (1953)’s and Young (1985)’s ax-
iomatizations, the validity of further axiomatizations of the Shapley value,
see e.g. van den Brink (2001) and Chun (1991) among others, on the classes
of airport games and irrigation games, is intended to be the topic of an other
paper.
The setup of this paper is as follows: in the next section we introduce the
concept of irrigation games and characterize the class of them. In Section
3 we present our main results: we show that Shapley (1953)’s and Young
(1985)’s axiomatizations of the Shapley value work on the classes of airport
games and irrigation games. In the last section we show that how cost
sharing axioms (see Thomson (2007)) correspond to axioms for solutions on
transferable utility cooperative games, and reformulate our results in the
classical cost sharing setting.
2 Airport and Irrigation Games
standard fixed tree games Notions, notations : #N is for the cardinality of
set N , and 2N denotes the class of all subsets of N . A ⊂ B means A ⊆ B,
but A 6= B. A unionmultiB stands for the union of disjoint sets A and B.
A graph is a pair G = (V,A), where the elements of V are called vertices
or nodes, and A stands for the ordered pairs of vertices, called arcs or edges.
A rooted tree is a graph in which any two vertices are connected by exactly
one simple path, and one vertex has been designated the root, in which case
the edges have a natural orientation, away from the root. The tree-order
is the partial ordering on the vertices of a rooted tree with i ≤ j, if the
unique path from the root to j passes through i. The chain is a rooted
tree such that any vertices i, j ∈ N , i ≤ j or j ≤ i. That is, a chain is a
rooted tree with only one ”branch”. For any pair e ∈ A, e = ij means e
is an edge between vertices i, j ∈ V such that i ≤ j. For each i ∈ V , let
Si(G) = {j ∈ V : j ≥ i}, that is, for any i ∈ V , i ∈ Si(G). For each i ∈ V
let Pi(G) = {j ∈ V : j ≤ i}, that is, for any i ∈ V , i ∈ Pi(G). Moreover,
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for any V ′ ⊆ V , let (PV ′(G), AV ′) be the sub-rooted-tree of (V,A). where
PV ′(G) = ∪i∈V ′Pi(G) and AV ′ = {ij ∈ A : i, j ∈ PV ′(G)}.
Let c : A→ R+. Then c and (G, c) are called cost function and cost-tree
respectively. An interpretation of cost tree (G, c) might be as follows: there
is a given irrigation ditch joined to the stream by a headgate, and the users,
the vertices of the graph but the root are those who use this ditch to irrigate
their own farms. The functional and maintenance costs of the ditch are given
by c, and it is payed for by the users. More generally, the vertices might be
departments of a company, persons, etc. and for any e ∈ A, e = ij, ce is the
cost of joining player j to player i.
Let N 6= ∅, #N <∞, and v : 2N → R be a function such that v(∅) = 0.
Then N , v are called set of players, and transferable utility cooperative game
(henceforth game) respectively. The class of games with player set N is
denoted by GN . It is worth noticing that GN is isomorphic with R2#N−1,
henceforth, we assume there is a fixed isomorphism1 between the two spaces,
and regard GN and R2#N−1 as identical.
Game v ∈ GN is convex, if for all S, T ⊆ N , v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪
T ) + v(S ∩ T ), moreover, it is concave, if for all S, T ⊆ N , v(S) + v(T ) ≥
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
The dual of game v ∈ GN is game v¯ ∈ GN such that for all S ⊆ N ,
v¯(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S). It is well known that the dual of a convex game is
a concave game and vice versa.
Let v ∈ GN and i ∈ N , and v′i(S) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S), where S ⊆ N . v′i
is called player i’s marginal contribution function in game v. Alternatively,
v′i(S) is player i’s marginal contribution to coalition S in game v.
Let v ∈ GN , players i, j ∈ N are equivalent, i ∼v j, if for all S ⊆ N such
that i, j /∈ S, v′i(S) = v′j(S).
Let N and T ∈ 2N \ ∅, and for all S ⊆ N , let
uT (S) =
{
1, if T ⊆ S
0 otherwise
.
Then game uT is called unanimity game on coalition T .
In this paper we use the duals of the unanimity games. For any T ∈ 2N \∅
and for all S ⊆ N ,
u¯T (S) =
{
1, if T ∩ S 6= ∅
0 otherwise
.
1The fixed isomorphism is the following: we fix a complete ordering on N , that is N =
{1, . . . ,#N}. Then for all v ∈ GN , let v = (v({1}), . . . , v({#N}), v({1, 2}), . . . , v({#N −
1,#N}), . . . , v(N)) ∈ R2#N−1.
5
It is clear that every unanimity game is convex, and the duals of the
unanimity games are concave.
We assume that the considered cost-tree problems have fixed, at least
two, number of players, that is #V ≥ 3 and #N ≥ 2. First we introduce the
notion of irrigation games. Let (G, c) be a cost-tree, and N be the set of the
players (the vertices but the root). Moreover, consider S ⊆ N a non-empty
coalition, then the cost of connecting the players of S to the root is given by
the cost of the minimal rooted tree which covers coalition S. By this method
for each cost-tree we can define a game, called irrigation game. Formally,
Definition 1 (Irrigation Game). For any cost-tree (G, c), let N = V \{root}
be the player set, and for any coalition S (the empty sum is 0) let
v(G,c)(S) =
∑
e∈AS
c(e) .
Moreover, games like v are called irrigation games, and the class of irri-
gation games with player set N is denoted by GNI . If rooted tree G remains
fixed, then the class of induced games is denoted by GG.
The next example is an illustration of the above definition.
Example 2. Consider the cost-tree in Figure 1, where the rooted tree G =
(V,A) is as follows, V = {root, 1, 2, 3}, A = {root1, root2, 23}, and the cost
function c is defined as c(root1) = 12, c(root2) = 5 and c(23) = 8.
Figure 1: The cost-tree (G, c)
Then irrigation game v(G,c) = (0, 12, 5, 13, 17, 25, 13, 25), that is v(G,c)(∅)
= 0, v(G,c)({1}) = 12, v(G,c)({2}) = 5, v(G,c)({3}) = 13, v(G,c)({1, 2}) = 17,
v(G,c)({1, 3}) = 25, v(G,c)({2, 3}) = 13 and v(G,c)(N) = 25.
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The notion of airport games is introduced by Littlechild and Thompson
(1977). An airport problem can be illustrated by the following example.
There is an airport with one runway, and there are k types of planes. Each
type of planes i determines a cost ci for maintaining the runway. E.g. if i
stands for the small planes, then the maintenance cost of a runway for small
planes is ci. If j is the category of big planes, then ci < cj, since the big
planes need longer runway. That is, the player set N is given by a partition:
N = N1 unionmulti · · · unionmulti Nk, where Ni stands for the planes of category i, and each
category i determines a maintenance cost ci, such that c1 < . . . ck. When
we consider a coalition of players (planes) S, then the maintenance cost of
coalition S is the maximum maintenance cost of the members’ maintenance
costs of S. That is, the cost of coalition S is the maintenance cost of the
biggest plane of coalition S.
We provide two equivalent definitions of airport games; the first one is as
follows:
Definition 3 (Definition of Airport Games I). Let N = N1 unionmulti · · · unionmultiNk be the
player set, and c ∈ Rk+, such that c1 < . . . < ck ∈ R+ be an airport problem.
Then airport game v(N,c) ∈ GN is defined as follows, v(N,c)(∅) = 0, and for
each non-empty coalition S ⊆ N
v(N,c)(S) = max
i:Ni∩S 6=∅
ci .
An alternative definition of airport games is the following:
Definition 4 (Definition of Airport Games II). Let N = N1unionmulti· · ·unionmultiNk be the
player set, and c = c1 < . . . < ck ∈ R+ be an airport problem. Let G = (V,A)
be a chain such that V = N ∪ {root} and A = {root1, 12, . . . ,#N − 1#N},
where N1 = {1, . . . ,#N1}, . . . , Nk = {#N −#Nk + 1, . . . ,#N}. Moreover,
for each ij ∈ A, let c(ij) = cN(j)−cN(i), where N(i) = {N∗ ∈ {N1, · · · , Nk} :
i ∈ N∗}.
For cost-tree (G, c) airport game v(N,c) ∈ GN is defined as follows, let
N = V \ {root} be the player set, and for any coalition S (the empty sum is
0)
v(N,c)(S) =
∑
e∈AS
c(e) .
It is obvious that both definitions above give the same games, and let the
class of airport games with player set N be denoted by GNA . Furthermore,
if chain G remains fixed, then the class of induced games is denoted by GG.
Notice that, the notation GG is consistent with the notation introduced in
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Definition 1, because if G is a chain, then GG ⊆ GA, in other cases, when G
is not a chain, GG \GA 6= ∅. Since not every rooted tree is a chain, GNA ⊂ GNI .
Example 5. Consider the airport problem (N, c′), where N = {{1} unionmulti {2, 3}},
and c′N(1) = 5 and c
′
N(2) = c
′
N(3) = 8 (N(2) = N(3)). Then consider
the cost-tree in Figure 2, where the rooted tree G = (V,A) is as follows,
V = {root, 1, 2, 3}, A = {root1, 12, 23}, and the cost function c is defined as
c(root1) = 5, c(12) = 3 and c(23) = 0.
Figure 2: The cost-tree (G, c)
Then the induced airport game is as follows: v(G,c) = (0, 5, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8),
that is v(G,c)(∅) = 0, v(G,c)({1}) = 5, v(G,c)({2}) = v(G,c)({3}) = v(G,c)({1, 2})
= v(G,c)({1, 3}) = v(G,c)({2, 3}) = v(G,c)(N) = 8.
Next we characterize the classes of airport games and irrigation games.
First, we take an obvious observation, for any rooted tree G, GG is a cone,
that is for any α ≥ 0, αGG ⊆ GG. Since union of cones is also a cone, both
GNA and GNI are cones.
Lemma 6. For any rooted tree G, GG is a cone, therefore, GNA and GNI are
cones.
In the following lemma we show that the dual of any unanimity game is
an airport game.
Lemma 7. For any chain G, T ⊆ N such that T = Si(G), i ∈ N , u¯T ∈ GG.
Therefore, {u¯T}T∈2N\{∅} ⊂ GNA ⊂ GNI .
Proof. For any i ∈ N , N = (N \ Si(G)) unionmulti Si(G), and let c1 = 0 and c2 = 1,
that is the cost of the members of coalition N \ Si(G) is 0, and the cost of
the members of coalition Si(G) is 1 (see Definition 3). Then the generated
airport game v(G,c) = u¯Si(G).
On the other hand, it is clear that there is an airport game which is not
the dual of any unanimity game. 
It is important to see how the classes of airport games and irrigation
games are related to the convex cone spanned by the duals of the unanimity
games.
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Lemma 8. For any rooted tree G, GG ⊂ cone {u¯Si(G)}i∈N . Therefore, GA ⊂
GNI ⊂ cone {u¯T}T∈2N\{∅}.
Proof. First we show that GG ⊂ cone {u¯Si(G)}i∈N .
Let v ∈ GG be an irrigation game. Since G = (V,A) is a rooted tree, for
each i ∈ N , #{j ∈ V : ji ∈ A} = 1, so we can name the node before player
i, let i− = {j ∈ V : ji ∈ A}. Then for any i ∈ N , let αSi(G) = ci−i.
Finally, it is easy to see that v =
∑
i∈N αSi(G)u¯Si(G).
Second we show that cone {u¯Si(G)}i∈N \ GG 6= ∅. Let N = {1, 2}, then∑
T∈2N\{∅} u¯T /∈ GG, that is game (1, 1, 3) is not an irrigation game. 
The following example is an illustration of the above result.
Example 9. Consider the irrigation game of Example 2. Then S1(G) = {1},
S2(G) = {2, 3} and S3(G) = {3}. Furthermore, αS1(G) = 12, αS2(G) = 5 and
αS3(G) = 8. Finally, v(G,c) = 12u¯{1} + 5u¯{2,3} + 8u¯{3} =
∑
i∈N αSi(G)u¯Si(G).
Next we discuss further corollaries of Lemmata 7 and 8. First we show
that even if for any rooted tree G, GG is a convex set, the classes of airport
games and irrigation games are not convex.
Lemma 10. GNA is not a convex set, moreover GNI is not convex either.
Proof. Let N = {1, 2}. From Lemma 6 {u¯T}T∈2N\{∅} ⊆ GNA , however,∑
T∈2N\{∅}
1
3
u¯T /∈ GNI , that is game (1/3, 1/3, 1) is not an irrigation game. 
The following corollary has a key role in Young (1985)’s axiomatization
of the Shapley value on the classes of airport games and irrigation games.
It is well-known that the duals of the unanimity games are linearly in-
dependent vectors. From Lemma 8, for any rooted tree G and v ∈ GG,
v =
∑
i∈N αSi(G)uSi(G), where weights αSi(G) are well-defined, that is those
are uniquely determined. The following lemma says that for any game v ∈ GG
if we erase the weight of any basis vector (the duals of the unanimity games),
then we get a game belonging to GG.
Lemma 11. For any rooted tree G and v =
∑
i∈N αSi(G)u¯Si(G) ∈ GG, for each
i∗ ∈ N , ∑i∈N\{i∗} αSi(G)u¯Si(G) ∈ GG. Therefore, for any airport game v =∑
T∈2N\{∅} αT u¯T and T
∗ ∈ 2N \ {∅}, ∑T∈2N\{∅,T ∗} αT u¯T ∈ GNA , and for any
irrigation game v =
∑
T∈2N\{∅} αT u¯T and T
∗ ∈ 2N\{∅}, ∑T∈2N\{∅,T ∗} αT u¯T ∈
GNI .
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Proof. Let v =
∑
i∈N αSi(G)u¯Si(G) and i
∗ ∈ N . Then let the cost function c′
be defined as follows, for any e ∈ A, (see the proof of Lemma 8)
c′e =
{
0, if e = i∗−i∗
ce otherwise
.
Then game
∑
i∈N\{i∗} αSi(G)u¯Si(G) = v(G,c′), that is
∑
i∈N\{i∗} αSi(G)u¯Si(G) ∈
GG. 
The following example is an illustration of the above result.
Example 12. Consider the irrigation game of Example 2, and take player 2.
Then c′(e) =

12, if e = root1
0, if e = root2
8, if e = 23
. Moreover,
∑
i∈N\{i∗} αSi(G)u¯Si(G) =
12u¯{1} + 8u¯{3} = v(G,c′) is an irrigation game.
Finally, an obvious observation:
Lemma 13. Every irrigation game is concave.
Proof. The duals of the unanimity games are concave games, hence Lemma
8 implies the statement. 
To sum up our results we conclude as follows:
Corollary 14. The class of airport games is a union of finitely many convex
cones, but it is not convex, and it is a proper subset of the class of irrigation
games. The class of irrigation games is also a union of finitely many convex
cones, but is not convex either, and it is a proper subset of the finite convex
cone spanned by the duals of the unanimity games, therefore every irrigation
game is concave, so every airport game is concave too.
3 Solutions for irrigation games
In this section we propose solutions for irrigation games.
A solution on set A ⊆ GN ψ is a map-valued mapping ψ : A RN , that
is a solution assign a set of allocations to each game. In the following, we
define two solutions.
Let v ∈ GN and
piSh(S) =

#S!(#(N \ S)− 1)!
#N !
, if i /∈ S
0 otherwise
.
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Then φi(v) the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of player i in game v is the p
i
Sh
expected value of v′i. In other words
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N
v′i(S) p
i
Sh(S) . (1)
Furthermore, let φ denote the Shapley solution.
It is obvious from its definition that the Shapley solution is a single valued
solution.
Next, we introduce an other solution: the core (Gillies, 1959). Let v ∈ GNI
be an irrigation game. Then the core of irrigation game v is defined as follows
core (v) =
{
x ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), and for any S ⊆ N,
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ v(S)
}
.
The core consists of the stable allocations of the value of the grand coali-
tion, that is any allocation of the core is such that the allocated cost is the
total cost (
∑
i∈N xi = v(N)) and no coalition has incentive to deviate from
the allocation scheme.
In the following definition we list the axioms we use to characterize a
single valued solution.
Definition 15. A single valued solution ψ on A ⊆ GN is / satisfies
• Pareto optimal (PO), if for all v ∈ A, ∑
i∈N
ψi(v) = v(N),
• null-player property (NP ), if for all v ∈ A, i ∈ N , v′i = 0 implies
ψi(v) = 0,
• equal treatment property (ETP ), if for all v ∈ A, i, j ∈ N , i ∼v j
implies ψi(v) = ψj(v),
• additive (ADD), if for all v, w ∈ A such that v + w ∈ A, ψ(v + w)
= ψ(v) + ψ(w),
• marginal (M), if for all v, w ∈ A, i ∈ N , v′i = w′i implies ψi(v) = ψi(w).
Brief interpretations of the above introduced axioms are as follows: An
other, commonly used name of axiom PO is Efficiency. This axiom requires
that the total cost must be shared among the players. Axiom NP is about
that if a player’s marginal contribution is zero, that is she has no influence,
effect on the given situation, then her share (her value) must be zero.
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On the class of transferable utility games axiom ETP is equivalent with
an other well known axiom, with Symmetry. These axioms put the require-
ment that, if two players have the same effects in the given situation, then
their evaluations must be equal. Going back to our example, if two users are
equivalent in regard to their irrigation costs, then their cost shares must be
equal.
A solution meets axiom ADD, if for any two games, adding up the games
first then evaluate the players, or evaluate the players first then adding up
their evaluations does not matter. Axiom M requires that, if a given player
in two games produces the same marginal contributions, then the player must
be evaluated equally in the two games.
First we take an obvious observation:
Proposition 16. Let A,B ⊆ GN . If a set of axioms S characterizes solution
ψ on both classes of games A and B, then set of axioms S characterizes
solution ψ on class A ∪B.
In this section we consider two characterizations of the Shapley value on
the classes of airport games and irrigation games. The first one is Shapley’s
original axiomatization (Shapley, 1953).
Theorem 17. For any rooted tree G, a single valued solution ψ on GG is
PO, NP , ETP and ADD if and only if ψ = φ, that is, if and only if it
is the Shapley solution. Therefore, a single valued solution ψ on the class
of airport games is PO, NP , ETP and ADD if and only if ψ = φ, and a
single valued solution ψ on the class of irrigation games is PO, NP , ETP
and ADD if and only if ψ = φ.
Proof. if: It is well known that the Shapley solution meets axioms PO, NP ,
ETP and ADD, see e.g. Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003).
only if: From Lemmata 6 and 7 ψ is defined on the cone spanned by
{u¯Si(G)}i∈N .
Take i∗ ∈ N . Then for any α ≥ 0 and players i, j ∈ Si∗(G), i ∼αu¯Si∗ (G) j,
and for any player i /∈ Si∗(G), i ∈ NP (αu¯Si∗ (G)).
Then axiom NP implies that for any player i /∈ Si∗(G), ψi(αu¯Si∗ (G)) = 0.
Moreover, from axiom ETP for any players i, j ∈ Si∗(G), ψi(αu¯Si∗ (G)) =
ψj(αu¯Si∗ (G)). Finally, axiom PO implies
∑
i∈N ψi(αu¯Si∗ (G)).
Therefore ψ(αu¯Si∗ (G)) is well-defined (unique), so since the Shapley solu-
tion meets axioms PO, NP and ETP , ψ(αu¯Si∗ (G)) = φ(αu¯Si∗ (G)).
It is also well known that {uT}T∈2N\∅ is a basis of GN , and that so is
{u¯T}T∈2N\∅.
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Let v ∈ GG be an irrigation game. Then Lemma 8 implies that
v =
∑
i∈N
αSi(G)u¯Si(G) ,
where for any i ∈ N , αSi(G) ≥ 0.
From axiom ADD ψ(v) is well-defined (unique), so since the Shapley
solution meets axiom ADD and for any i ∈ N , αSi(G) ≥ 0, ψ(αSi(G)u¯Si(G)) =
φ(αSi(G)u¯Si(G)), ψ(v) = φ(v).
Finally, we can apply Proposition 16. 
In the proof of Theorem 17 we have applied a modified version of Shapley’s
original proof. In his proof Shapley uses the unanimity games as the basis
of GN . In the proof above we consider the duals of the unanimity games as
a basis and use Proposition 16 and Lemmata 6, 7, 8. It is worth noticing
that (we discuss it in the next section) for the airport games Theorem 17 is
also proved by Dubey (1982), so in this sense our result is also an alternative
proof for Dubey (1982)’s result.
Next, we consider Young’s axiomatization of the Shapley value (Young,
1985). This was the first axiomatization of the Shapley value not involving
axiom ADD.
Theorem 18. For any rooted tree G, a single valued solution ψ on GG is
PO, ETP and M if and only if ψ = φ, that is, if and only if it is the Shapley
solution. Therefore, a single valued solution ψ on the class of airport games
is PO, ETP and M if and only if ψ = φ, and a single valued solution ψ on
the class of irrigation games is PO, ETP and M if and only if ψ = φ.
Proof. if: It is well known that the Shapley solution meets axioms PO, ETP
and M , see e.g. Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003).
only if: The proof goes, as that Young’s proof does, by induction. For any
irrigation game v ∈ GG, let B(v) = #{αSi(G) > 0 : v =
∑
i∈N αSi(G)u¯Si(G)}.
It is clear that B(·) is well-defined.
If B(v) = 0, then axioms PO and ETP imply that ψ(v) = φ(v).
Assume that for any game v ∈ GG such that B(v) ≤ n, ψ(v) = φ(v).
Furthermore, let v =
∑
i∈N αSi(G)u¯Si(G) ∈ GG be such that B(v) = n+ 1.
Let i∗ ∈ N be a player such that there exists i ∈ N such that αSi(G) 6= 0
and i∗ /∈ Si(G). Then Lemmata 8 and 11 imply that
∑
j∈N\{i} αSj(G)u¯Sj(G) ∈
GG, and
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 ∑
j∈N\{i}
αSj(G)u¯Sj(G)
′
i∗
= v′i∗ ,
therefore from axiom M
ψi∗(v) = ψi∗
 ∑
j∈N\{i}
αSj(G)u¯Sj(G)
 ,
that is ψi∗(v) is well-defined (uniquely determined).
Assume that i∗, j∗ ∈ N are such that for any i ∈ N such that αSi(G) 6= 0,
i∗, j∗ ∈ Si(G). Then i∗ ∼v j∗, so axiom ETP implies that ψi∗(v) = ψj∗(v).
By axiom PO,
∑
i∈N ψi(v) = v(N). Therefore, ψ(v) is well-defined (u-
niquely determined), so since the Shapley solution meets the three considered
axioms (PO, ETP an d M), ψ(v) = φ(v).
Finally, we can apply Proposition 16. 
In the above proof we apply the idea of Young’s proof, so we do not need
the alternative proofs for Young (1985)’s axiomatization of the Shapley value
provided by Moulin (1988) and Pinte´r (2011). We can do so because Lemma
11 ensures that when we apply the induction step in the only if branch we
do not leave the considered classes of games. It is also worth noticing that
(we discuss it in the next section) for the airport games Theorem 18 is also
proved by Moulin and Shenker (1992), so in this sense our result is also an
alternative proof for Moulin and Shenker (1992)’s result.
Finally, Lemma 13 and the well-known results of Shapley (1971) and
Ichiishi (1981) imply the following corollary:
Corollary 19. For any irrigation game v, φ(v) ∈ Core (v), that is, the
Shapley solution is in the core. Moreover, since every airport game is an
irrigation game, for any airport game v, φ(v) ∈ Core (v).
The above corollary shows that on the two considered classes of games
the Shapley value is stable, that is it can be considered as a special core
concept, a singleton core.
4 Cost sharing results
In this section we reformulate our results in the classical cost sharing setting.
To unify the different terminologies appearing in the literature we extensively
14
use Thomson (2007)’s notions. First we introduce the notion of rule. Con-
sider the class of cost-tree allocation problems, that is the set of cost-trees.
Then a rule is a mapping which assigns a cost allocation to a cost-tree al-
location problem, that is it says the method by which the cost is allocated
among the players. Notice that the rule is a single valued mapping. The
analogy between solutions and rules is clear, the only important difference is
that while the solution is a set-valued mapping, the rule is single-valued.
Next we introduce the rule used in this paper. For any cost tree (G, c)
(G = (V,A)), the sequential equal contributions rule, ξ, is defined as follows,
for any player i
ξi(G, c) =
∑
j∈Pi(G)\{root}
cj−j
#Sj(G)
.
In the case of airport games, where the graph G is a chain, the sequential
equal contributions rule, ξ, can be given as follows, for any player i
ξi(G, c) =
c1
n
+ · · ·+ ci
n− i+ 1 ,
where the players are ordered according to the their positions in the chain,
that is player i is in the ith position of the chain.
Littlechild and Owen (1973) show that the sequential equal contributions
rule and the Shapley value coincide on the class of irrigation games.
Proposition 20 (Littlechild and Owen (1973)). For any cost-tree (G, c),
ξ(G, c) = φ(v(G,c)), where v(G,c) is the irrigation game generated by cost-tree
(G, c), that is for cost-tree allocation problems the sequential equal contribu-
tions rule and the Shapely solution coincide.
Next we consider certain properties of rules (see Thomson (2007)).
Definition 21. Let G = (V,A) be a rooted tree. Rule χ defined on the set
of cost-trees of G satisfies
• non-negativity, if for each cost function c, χ(G, c) ≥ 0,
• cost boundedness, if for each cost function c, χ(G, c) ≤
( ∑
e∈APi(G)
ce
)
i∈N
,
• efficiency, if for each cost function c, ∑
i∈N
χi(G, c) =
∑
e∈A
ce,
• equal treatment of equals, if for each cost function c and pair of players
i, j ∈ N , ∑
e∈APi(G)
ce =
∑
e∈APj(G)
ce implies χi(G, c) = χj(G, c),
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• conditional cost additivity, if for any pair of cost functions c, c′, χ(G, c+
c′) = ξ(G, c) + χ(G, c′),
• independence of at-least-as-large costs, if for any pair of cost functions
c, c′ and player i ∈ N such that for each j ∈ Pi(G),
∑
e∈APj(G)
ce =∑
e∈APj(G)
c′e, χi(G, c) = χi(G, c
′).
The interpretations of the above defined rule-properties are as follows (see
Thomson (2007)). Non-negativity says that for each problem, the rule should
only pick a non-negative cost allocation vector. Cost boundedness is about
that the cost allocation vector should be bounded above by the individual
costs. Efficiency says that coordinates of the cost allocation vector should add
up to the maximal cost. Equal treatment of equals is about that players with
equal individual costs should pay equal amounts. Conditional cost additivity
says that if two cost-trees are added, then the cost allocation vector chosen
for the sum problem should be the sum of the cost allocation vectors chosen
for each of them. Finally, independence of at-least-as-large costs is about
that what a player pays should not depend on the costs of the segments he
does not use.
These properties are similar to the axioms we defined in Definition 15.
The following proposition formalizes the similarity.
Proposition 22. Let G be a rooted tree, χ be defined on cost-trees (G, c),
solution ψ be defined on GG as ψ(v(G,c)) = χ(G, c) for any cost function c.
Then, if χ satisfies
• non-negativity and cost boundedness, then ψ is NP ,
• efficiency, then ψ is PO,
• equal treatment of equals, then ψ is ETP ,
• conditional cost additivity, then ψ is ADD,
• independence of at-least-as-large costs, then ψ is M .
Proof. Non-negativity and cost boundedness⇒NP : It is obvious that player
i is a null-player, only if
∑
e∈APi(G)
ce = 0. Then non-negativity implies
that χi(G, c) ≥ 0, and from cost boundedness, χi(G, c) ≤ 0, to sum up
χi(G, c) = 0, so ψ(v(G,c)) = 0.
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Efficiency ⇒ PO: From the definition of irrigation games (Definition 1),∑
e∈A ce = v(G,c)(N), therefore
∑
i∈N ψi(v(G,c)) =
∑
i∈N χi(G, c) =
∑
e∈A ce
= v(G,c)(N).
Equal treatment of equals ⇒ ETP : It is clear that, if i ∼v(G,c) j, i, j ∈
N , then
∑
e∈APi(G)
ce =
∑
e∈APj(G)
ce, so χi(G, c) = χj(G, c). Therefore, if
i ∼v(G,c) j, i, j ∈ N , then ψi(v(G,c)) = ψj(v(G,c)).
Conditional cost additivity ⇒ ADD: ψ(v(G,c) + v(G′.c′)) = ψ(v(G,c+c′)) =
χ(G, c+c′) = χ((G, c)+(G′, c′)) = χ(G, c)+χ(G′, c′) = ψ(v(G,c))+ψ(v(G′,c′)).
Independence of at-least-as-large costs ⇒ M : It is easy to check that if
for cost-trees (G, c), (G, c′) and player i ∈ N , (v(G,c))′i = (v(G,c′))′i, then for
each j ∈ Pi(G),
∑
e∈APj(G)
ce =
∑
e∈APj(G)
c′e, so χi(G, c) = χi(G, c
′). To sum
up, (v(G,c))
′
i = (v(G,c′))
′
i implies ψi(v(G,c)) = ψi(v(G,c′)). 
It is worth noticing that all but the efficiency point are tight, so the cost
sharing axioms are stronger than the game theory axioms.
The above results and Theorem 17 implies as a direct corollary, Dubey
(1982)’s result.
Theorem 23 (Dubey (1982)). Rule χ on airport problems satisfies non-
negativity, cost boundedness, efficiency, equal treatment of equals and con-
ditional cost additivity, if and only if χ = ξ, that is if and only if χ is the
sequential equal contributions rule.
Proof. If: It is a slight calculation to show that the sequential equal contribu-
tions rule satisfies non-negativity, cost boundedness, efficiency, equal treat-
ment of equals and conditional cost additivity (see e.g. Thomson (2007)).
Only if: Proposition 22 implies that we can apply Theorem 17 and get
the Shapley solution. Then from Proposition 20 the Shapley solution and
the sequential equal contributions rule coincide. 
Similarly to Dubey (1982)’s result we deduce from the results above and
Theorem 18 Moulin and Shenker (1992)’s result.
Theorem 24 (Moulin and Shenker (1992)). Rule χ on airport problems
satisfies efficiency, equal treatment of equals and independence of at-least-as-
large costs, if and only if χ = ξ, that is if and only if χ is the sequential equal
contributions rule.
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Proof. If: It is a slight calculation to show that the sequential equal contri-
butions rule satisfies efficiency, equal treatment of equals and independence
of at-least-as-large costs (see e.g. Thomson (2007)).
Only if: Proposition 22 implies that we can apply Theorem 18 and get
the Shapley solution. Then from Proposition 20 the Shapley solution and
the sequential equal contributions rule coincide. 
Finally, in the following theorems we extend Dubey (1982)’s and Moulin
and Shenker (1992)’s results to any cost-tree allocation problem. The proofs
of these results go as that for the two above theorems.
Theorem 25. Rule χ on cost-tree problems satisfies non-negativity, cost
boundedness, efficiency, equal treatment of equals and conditional cost addi-
tivity, if and only if χ = ξ, that is if and only if χ is the sequential equal
contributions rule.
Theorem 26. Rule χ on cost-tree problems satisfies efficiency, equal treat-
ment of equals and independence of at-least-as-large costs, if and only if
χ = ξ, that is if and only if χ is the sequential equal contributions rule.
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